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Abstract — To secure cryptography hardware implementation 
many works are focusing on side-channels attacks. For such 
attacks, several different countermeasures can be done at 
different levels abstraction. But all published countermeasures 
lead to a significant area and power consumption overhead. In 
this paper, we present a new countermeasure against DPA attack 
which also leads to very small implementation compared to 
existing countermeasures such as the most used: masking 
schemes. The proposed approach is to use a correlated power 
noise generator to remove the design power correlation with the 
secret key. Its efficiency is proved with a practical DPA attack 
realization on Actel Fusion FLASH FPGA and Xilinx Virtex 4 
SRAM FPGA. With the proposed countermeasure, the full 128-
bits AES implementation on Xilinx Virtex 4 has a smaller area 
overhead (12.78 times less) than masking scheme 
countermeasure. 
Keywords: DPA, AES, FPGA, countermeasures, hardware securiy. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [1] will replace 
the old DES algorithm [2] in a broad variety of applications. 
Now, AES has become a world-wide standard with an even 
wider use than the DES. During the AES selection process, the 
security of AES was evaluated with respect to all types of 
attacks. 
While being resistant to the classical cryptanalytic methods, 
it turned out that so-called implementation attacks are a serious 
threat against naive implementations of the AES algorithm. 
Implementation attacks refer to a new class of cryptanalysis 
methods, which are aimed against implementations of 
cryptographic primitives. Power analysis attacks are passive 
non invasive attacks. Kocher et al. have shown they are very 
effective and relatively cheap to conduct in practice [3].  
In this paper, we will focus on Differential Power Analysis 
DPA [3]. In this attack, an adversary predicts target device 
power consumption with an hypothetical model. Those 
predictions are then compared to the real, measured power 
consumption in purpose to recover secret key. DPA has been 
shown efficient to defeat processor, ASIC and even FPGA 
implementations [4-5]. 
To overcome this attack, countermeasures can be 
implemented to secure AES implementations. They can be at 
the gate, system, or algorithmic levels. The first ones are based 
on the logic styles that aim to achieve independence between 
secret key and the power consumption. The second ones focus 
on into deteriorating side-channel signal quality. The third ones 
mask the manipulated data to remove this dependence. At the 
gate level, they are the most costly for area and power 
consumption. In embedded design case, all this 
countermeasures are too area and power consuming. To answer 
to this issue, we propose a new low-cost architectural 
countermeasure. 
In this paper, we investigate the possibility to counteract 
these attacks by using a new correlated power noise generator. 
This new countermeasure name is “interfering 
countermeasure”. Its basic idea is to add an interfering power 
signal which depends on the manipulated data and an 
interfering key. This key value has to be different from the 
secret key value. 
Paper is organized as follows. In the second section we 
present some interesting previous works. We explain, in 
section 3, our new approach to secure AES implementation 
based on power interfering. Section 4 gives the experimental 
results that permit us to conclude to the countermeasure 
efficiency. In section 5, we discuss the FPGA implementation 
performance comparison between our solution and the masking 
scheme. Based on these results we draw some conclusions in 
section 6. 
II. PREVIOUS WORKS 
Power analysis attacks work because the cryptographic 
devices power consumption depends on the executed 
cryptographic algorithms intermediate values. Hence, 
countermeasure goal against such attacks is to make the power 
consumption independent of those intermediate values. Several 
ones are suggested in the literature [4]. At the security point of 
view, the more efficient countermeasures acts at the 
algorithmic level or at the logic level. 
Algorithmic countermeasures can be restricted to the 
masking schemes. Its basic idea is to randomize the 
intermediate results that are produced during the computation 
of a cryptographic algorithm [6]. Such solutions need some 
modification in the design conception and a True Random 
Number Generator (TRNG) to generate the random masked 
[7]. Masking scheme is a stronger countermeasure against first 
order DPA. Nevertheless this countermeasure area overhead 
could be significant as we have shown in [8]. Moreover, such 
countermeasure is sensible to the glitch issue. It is inefficient if 
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the attacker obtain some post-layout information as 
demonstrated in [9].  
Logic countermeasures are based on special leakage-
resistant logic styles [10-11]. The power consumption of a 
circuit depends on the output transitions of the gates. If these 
transitions depend on secret information, the security of the 
implementation can be compromised. Hence, to make a circuit 
resistant against power analysis attacks, the power 
consumption should be independent of the secret information. 
The circuit-level approaches to achieve this can be divided into 
two categories: custom logic styles and standard logic styles. 
Custom logic styles are only applicable to custom ASIC 
implementations. Standard logic styles combine standard cells 
from existing libraries into new standard cells. In most of all 
cases these countermeasures are glitch sensitive. They need 
particular design of balanced architecture. Moreover such 
countermeasures are very area and power consuming [10-11].  
In [12], Standaert et al. introduce architectural 
countermeasure. Their idea is to generate an additive power 
noise signal from the part of the AES blocs by using unrolling 
architecture. As the AES rounds input are uncorrelated, each 
round is a power noise generator for the other rounds point of 
view. Add a power noise to the instantaneous power 
consumption feel an interesting way to protect the cipher 
against the DPA. Nevertheless such countermeasure is 
inefficient. Actually, the averaging in DPA filters out 
uncorrelated noise from the differential power trace. With such 
countermeasure it is only arduous to perform the DPA but 
always possible. The main advantage of architecture 
countermeasure is the very low area cost and low power 
consumption without frequency decrease.  
In order to take benefit of the architectural countermeasure 
with a high level of security, in the next section, we will 
introduce a new architectural countermeasure which uses a 
correlated power noise generator. 
III. PRINCIPLE OF INTERFERNCE COUNTERMEASURE   
 
In hardware implementation of AES, during the SubBytes 
step the power consumption traces are correlated with data 
computed in the design. These computing data are correlated 
with the AES secret key K used in the design. It seems like that 
K is printed in the power consumption traces. To be very quick 
and very efficient, DPA attacks take advantage of this security 
failure named Side Channel. 
To eliminate the side channel, our idea is to interfere the 
AES cipher power signal with a power signal correlated with 
cipher input data Din and with an interfering random key Kinterf. 
This architecture level countermeasure is illustrated by figure1. 
The input data Din is inserted simultaneously to two encryption 
cores: a classical AES core and an interference core used like a 
Correlated Power Noise Generator. The AES core performs 
the first AddRoundKey step with cipher data input Din and with 
the secret key K. At the same time, in the interference core, the 
cipher input data Din is provided to a similar module 
AddRoundKey but with the interfering key Kinterf. The outputs 
of the two AddRoundKey modules are applied to two similar 
SubBytes modules synchronously. The SubBytes modules 
outputs signals are two signals S and Sinterf. 
 
Figure 1.  Description of the new interference countermeasure. 
Like the signal S switching, the signal Sinterf switching is 
correlated to Din.  As the global power consumption is due to S 
and Sinterf switching both it is not only correlated to the secret K 
and the data Din.  Actually, the global cipher power 
consumption is corralled to data Din and the couple of secret 
keys (K, Kinterf). Thereby, it is not possible to extract the secret 
key K by the classical DPA attacks as we will experimentally 
prove in the next section 
Nevertheless, to be a DPA efficient countermeasure, the 
only condition needed is to have different value for secret key 
K and interference secret key Kinterf   as describe in the following 
rule:  
[ ]255..0, ∈≠ InterfInterf KKK  
To formally prove the benefit of the proposed 
countermeasure we use the Guilley et al. work [13]. In this 
work the authors give the first equation (1) that provides the 
formal justification to the DPA attacks with correlation 
analysis: 
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Where Pth is the chip power consumption, )1()1( +− tj is the 
balanced hamming weight, J is the set of nets in the netlist, 
↑ξ and ↓ξ the fall and rise transition power of a single net. 
This equation main assumption is that the manipulated data in 
the design are independent. In our case, we assume that the 
manipulated data are dependent.  In conclusion, with our 
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interfering countermeasure the equation (1) is not valid. So it is 
impossible to recover the secret key K with classical first order 
DPA without cipher text use. 
In the following section, we will experimentally prove the 
validity of this conclusion.  
IV. EXPRIMENTAL VALIDATION AND RESULT 
A. DPA experimentation 
1) Methodology of validation 
For DPA attack, the correlation analysis is chosen to 
evaluate the secret key. It consists in using Pearson coefficient 
between the measured power consumption VM and the power 
model MP. In our work, we use the hamming weight for the 8 
bit output of the SubBytes function. 
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To validate our countermeasure, we used two experiments. 
The first demonstrates that with independent inputs the DPA 
attack is still achievable. The second shows unsuccessful DPA 
practical implementation in the secure design with the 
proposed countermeasure.  
Before these two experiments, we have first attacked a 
sample design witch only contain the two first steps of an AES 
cipher (AddRoundKey and SubBytes). The experimental setup 
of the practical implementation of DPA attack will be 
described in the following. This first step has permitted us to 
validate our DPA lab described in the Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Exprimental lab for DPA attack  
We employ an Agilent 54622D digital oscilloscope which 
has a bandwidth of 100 MHz with maximum sampling rate of 
200 MegaSample/sec. To obtain enough sample points per 
cycle, we lowered our design speed to 95 Hz.  
The communication between the scope and the PC is done 
via the General Purpose Bus Interface (GPIB) which is 
specified in IEEE-488 standard. We insert a resistance with a 
0.2 Ω value between the power supply and the FPGA Board. 
We measure the voltage difference between CH1 and CH2. 
Note that the probe used has a low pass frequency response that 
will reject any DC signal, but will pass variable AC signals 
with bandwidth below to 20MHz. 
The next section will present and discus the obtained 
experimental results. 
2) DPA attack of unsecured AES S-Box 
To first test the DPA lab with power correlating analysis, 
we implemented a sample design with an ACTEL Fusion 
AfS600-FG256 FLASH FPGA, and with a XILINX Virtex4 
XCVLX25 SRAM FPGA. 
This sample design in figure 3 includes the 8-bits hardware 
module SubBytes and AddRoundKey. The input data Din is first 
added with a secret sub-key (8 bits) K with exclusive-or before 
to input the SubBytes module. To design the SubBytes module, 
we use the smallest S-Box up to date introduced by Canright 
[14] and we implement it [15]. 
 
Figure 3.  Attacked sample design block diagram.  
 
Figure 4.  Successful attack on the first two AES rounds for the correct key 
K=43 with 1000 measurements. 
With such DPA experimentation, figure 4 shows a 
successful correlation attack result with an unsecure cipher 
which uses the secret key K=43 with 1000 measurements. That 
confirms the DPA lab efficiency. 
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B. DPA Attack  on two adjacent S-Box with independent 
input  data 
To validate our countermeasure, we first apply 
simultaneously two independent input data Din1 and Din2 to two 
AddRoundKey modules. These modules use two 8-bits distinct 
secret keys K1 and K2. Figure 5 shows the attacked design. As 
show by this figure, one part (driven by Din2) of this dual 
architecture could be considered as an uncorrelated power 
noise generator for the other part (driven by Din1).  
We employ the same experimental DPA setup as explained 
in the previous subsection. The keys K1 and K2 are extracted 
with correlation power analysis as we can see on figure 6 (K1 
successful DPA attack) and figure 7 (K2 successful DPA 
attack). The results are given with Actel Fusion FLASH FPGA, 
 
Figure 7. Successful K2 attack with uncorrelated power noise generator 
(K1=43 and K2=145), 12 000 measurements. 
Figure 10. Unsuccessful K attack with correlated power noise 
generator (K=43 and KInterf=145), 20 480 measurements. 
Figure 9. Unsuccessful K attack with correlated power noise generator 
(K=43 and KInterf=145), 12 000 measurements. 
Figure 6. Successful K1 attack with uncorrelated power noise generator  
(K1=43 and K2=145), 12 000 measurements. 
Figure 8. Attacked sample design with correlated power noise 
generator (proposed DPA countermeasure). 
Figure 5. Attacked sample design with uncorrelated power noise 
generator. 
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however there are similarly testing with Xilinx Virtex4 SRAM 
FPGA. 
As a conclusion we obtain the same results that Standaert’s 
work, the DPA filters out the uncorrelated power noise. An 
additive uncorrelated power noise is not an efficient DPA 
countermeasure DPA attack on secure AES S-Box with 
interference countermeasure. 
 
1) DPA attack without considering the structure of the 
interference countermeasure  
For the last experiment we use the proposed 
countermeasure. In this case, to generate a correlated power 
noise, the same input data Din is used for the two modules 
(AddRoundKey and SubBytes) as figure 8 shows. So, as show 
by this figure, one part (which uses the interference secret key 
Kinterf) of this dual architecture could be considered as a 
correlated power noise generator for the other part (which uses 
the interference secret key K).  
Like for the validation test, we use 12 000 power traces 
measurements. The DPA doesn’t permit us to detect the secret 
key K as is shown in figure 9. 
We increase the number of measurements up to 100 000. 
We do not detect the secret key K. Figure 10 illustrates the 
result of unsuccessful attack with 20 480 measurements. 
We have tested with all possible values (255 values 
corresponding to 28 values space without the secret key value) 
of interference 8-bits secret key Kinterf. The results are the same 
with all the possible keys. 
2) DPA attack with considering the structure of the 
interference countermeasure  
 
The structure of our interference countermeasure is taking 
in consideration for DPA attack. Indeed, it possible to take into 
account of the countermeasure by changing the DPA power 
consumption model PM: 
PM=f(H(S)+H(SInterf))          (2) 
Where H is the Hamming weight function, S and SInterf are 
signals mentioned in figure 1. They are respectively the output 
of SubBytes with Din as input and the useful key K and the 
interference key Kinterf.  
We suppose that we doesn’t know the interference key 
Kinterf, we realize the DPA attack on our design with 
considering the power consumption model PM (equation (2)). 
The result illustrated by figure 11 shows an unsuccessful attack 
for our design with 20480 traces. 
C. Conclusion  
We are able to realize a successful DPA attack against an 
unsecured design with FPGA flash-based and SRAM-based 
implementation. The same experimental setup is used to try to 
attack a secure design with the proposed countermeasure. The 
results are shown that DPA doesn’t success to find the secret 
key K. Such experimentation shows the proposed 
countermeasure robustness.  
Figure 11. Unsuccessful K attack with new DPA prower prediction model on 
secure design with the proposed countermeasure (K=43 and KInterf=145),       
20 480 measurements. 
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PERFORMANCE OF 
MASKING SCHEME AND THE PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURE 
The proposed countermeasure uses the two operations 
SubBytes and AddRoundKey with 8-bit data. To compare its 
performance to the masking scheme, we implement the two 
operations with three ways: unsecured small S-Box proposed 
by [14], secure small S-Box with masking scheme proposed by 
[6] and secure small S-Box with our proposed interference 
countermeasure. Table I gives the implementation results with 
a Xilinx Virtex4 SRAM FPGA. Note that a Virtex4 slice is 
composed by two inputs Look Up Table, two D-Flip-Flop and 
one carry chain). All results are obtained by using Xilinx 8.2 
ISE CAD tool version with default synthesis and place-and-
route options. 
This table clearly shows that the proposed countermeasure 
with interference method is very low area cost. The area 
overhead is only 16 Virtex4 slices for AddRoundKey and 
SubBytes implementation. It costs an area around 4 times 
smaller than the masking solution (without the TRNG area 
cost). 
Unlike the masking solution, with our solution the critical 
path is not lengthened. Consequently, the maximal frequency 
for unsecure design and secure design with our proposed 
countermeasure is the same, whereas the maximal frequency is 
reduced with masking countermeasure. 
We implemented the whole AES on the same FPGA. We 
use the 16 times S-Box for all the design. Table II summarizes 
the performance of the different implementations. We note that 
the implementation of the secure AES with masking do not 
take into consideration the implementation of the random 
generator to produce the mask (the same masks are used in all 
rounds). The area overhead of our secured implementation 
compared to the unsecured version is less than 5%. The 
masking solution gives an area overhead of about 60%. 
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Table I Performance Compraison between AES S-Box implementation in 
virtex 4 XC4VLX25-FF676 
Performance 
AES S-Box 
Unsecured 
[14] 
Secure with  
Masking [6] 
Secure with 
proposed 
method  
Area (slices) 36  100 52 
Area overhead  0% + 170% + 44% 
Frequency (MHz) 184 122 184 
Frequency 
decreasing   
0% - 33% 0% 
 
Table II  Performance compraison between  implementation full AES in 
Xilinx Virtex 4 XC4VLX25-FF676 device 
Performance 
AES  
Unsecured 
[14]  
Secure with 
masking [6] 
Secure with 
proposed 
method 
Area (slices) 1424 2281 1491 
Area overhead 0% + 60,1% + 4.7% 
Frequency (MHz) 143 97 143 
Frequency 
decreasing   
0% -11% 0% 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a new architectural countermeasure for DPA 
attacks against AES is introduced. This new low cost solution 
uses an efficient correlated power noise generator. As the 
power noise is correlated with the input data it is not possible 
to filter out it during DPA process. So this solution is DPA 
resistant as shown by our experimental result. Although, we 
have not test it with high order DPA, we assume that our 
solution is the lower cost first order DPA countermeasure. 
Indeed, some FPGA implementation results, with Xilinx 
Virtex4 device, have shown that comparing to existing 
masking scheme and secure logic countermeasure, our solution 
consume less area and power. Moreover, with an appropriate 
design, the proposed solution costs any frequency decrease.  
With the targeted FPGA, the secure AES cipher consumes only 
5% more slice than the unsecure cipher. 
In the near future, we have to improve the proposed 
solution to secure the cipher against DPA on the last AES 
round. Such attack use encrypted texts as a prediction power 
consumption model input. Actually, the proposed 
countermeasure architecture (figure 1) could only prevent DPA 
against AES first round. Nevertheless, if the AES block encrypt 
output are never output of the chip, that is the case of many 
application, our solution is sufficient.  
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